

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

38

OCI No. 0363/66

Copy No. 46

WEEKLY REPORT



THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

9 March 1966

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

25X1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

SECRET

25X1

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE


The pace of the war remained intense throughout the past week, largely as a result of allied offensives which inflicted heavy losses on the Communist forces. Viet Cong - initiated activity declined considerably from the previous reporting period, possibly reflecting the impact of recent allied spoiling operations. The Communists, however, mounted three large attacks and conducted harassing actions against shipping south of Saigon, possibly in an effort to block the main channel to the port of Saigon.

25X1

-iv-

25X1

SECRET



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

25X1

25X1

Economic Situation

11. New Minister of Economy Au Truong Thanh held his first press conference on 7 March. The key points announced were the release of GVN foreign exchange to the extent of US \$58 million for March and April import licensing, the promise of greater exchange to meet future demand, and a new tax on GVN-financed imports, particularly on luxury items. Thanh had previously indicated a preference for increased import duties in lieu of the increased excise taxes and import deposits which were agreed to at the Honolulu meetings.

12. Thanh stated that there were three major problems requiring immediate attention. First, the Saigon port must be cleared. Thanh cited previously announced steps to speed up the handling and clearance of goods through customs, the expansion of the port facilities, and increased transport from the port areas. Second, supply and demand must be balanced. He noted that better port operation and the release of the GVN exchange for March and April should help close the gap between demand and supply. Third, the distribution network should be improved.

-4-


Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

SECRET


25X1

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9



The GVN would do this by freeing the sales of certain goods and establishing security stocks not only in Saigon but also in the provinces.



Thanh has already implied to US officials that, for political reasons, he may proceed more slowly in introducing drastic steps to curb inflation than he had originally contemplated.

14. Rice deliveries from the Mekong delta totaled 33,189 MT during February, the second month in succession in which deliveries reached a nine-year low. Deliveries improved during the first week in March and the USAID of IV Corps has estimated that the current delta crop will exceed last year's by 15 percent. The wholesale price of No. 1/25 percent broken rice has fallen from about VN \$850 per 100 kg to VN \$800/810 range. Rice merchants are afraid of selling above the official prices (which the government has tolerated up to now) as a result of the recent arrests and the death sentences given to the steel dealers who sold at higher than official prices. However, high prices are still being quoted in the delta.

15. Retail prices in Saigon dropped substantially in the week ending 28 February. The principal decreases were in meats and vegetables but most other items, both food and non-food, also fell. The decline in prices was reportedly due to supplies arriving in normal quantities, coupled with the market psychology induced by the appointment of the new minister of economy. The USAID Index showed retail prices three percent below the level of a week ago and four percent below the level of the previous month. Import commodity prices also fell, many of them by greater amounts than retail prices. The greatest decline in prices was in wheat flour, iron and steel mill products, and newsprint. The price of cement in Saigon has also fallen.



Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

~~SECRET~~

25X1

~~Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9~~

~~SECRET~~

16. On the Saigon free market, prices of US \$10 bills and \$10 MPC (scrip) inched up one piaster per dollar each to 170 and 118 respectively. Gold was still at 233, and in Hong Kong the piaster-dollar cross rate remained at 159.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity for the week ending 5 March declined considerably.

2. During the period there were 733 Communist-initiated incidents compared with the preceding week's 938 - about the same as the weekly average for the last half of 1965 but about 100 less than the 1966 weekly average. There were 13 attacks (all but three were small scale) and 445 incidents of terror. This is in contrast to 26 and 574 respectively for the previous week. The large-scale attacks occurred in Quang Ngai, Binh Duong and Binh Tuy provinces. The kill ratio favored Free World Forces 5.9 to 1, up from the last report of 2.2 to 1. Viet Cong casualties included 1,622 killed and 193 captured; previous totals were 1,122 killed and 92 captured. South Vietnamese casualties for the reporting period were 205 killed, 382 wounded and 97 captured or missing - a total of 684 compared to 1,388 in the last reporting period. Total US casualties dropped to 819 from the 887 of the previous week; total Free World casualties also dropped - from 58 to 49. The South Vietnamese lost 296 weapons and captured 452 from the Communists; enemy losses included 35 crew-served weapons, while friendly forces lost three.

GVN/Allied Activities

3. Friendly activity continued at a high level for the fourth week with emphasis on search-and-destroy operations. There were more small-unit and battalion-size operations during this period, but less contacts with the enemy. However, they resulted in the highest enemy losses recorded since November 1965.

4. For the second straight week, over 50 percent of ARVN casualties were suffered in I Corps area, but the large number of enemy killed (925) in this area may have seriously affected enemy offensive plans. A seven-day ARVN operation in Quang Tri Province was terminated. Results were 444 enemy killed, 12 captured, and 58 weapons seized. Friendly losses were 35 killed, 185 wounded, and three missing. The most significant

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

battle of the week occurred in Quang Ngai Province where ARVN and US troops conducted Operation UTAH/LIEN KIET. A suspected PAVN regiment was heavily engaged, and in the ensuing battle friendly losses were 113 killed (83 US, 30 ARVN) and 324 wounded (205 US, 119 ARVN). Enemy losses were 586 killed (body count), five captured, and 39 suspects taken.

5. On 1 March in Pleiku Province, II Corps area, timely air support and armored cavalry reinforcement turned a Viet Cong attack on a ranger battalion into an ARVN victory. Friendly losses were four killed and three wounded, while 72 VC were killed and 23 weapons captured. In the coastal area of Phu Yen Province, during Operation [] US forces fought a sharp engagement with the VC on 4 March, bringing cumulative VC losses for the operation to 214 VC killed, 15 captured, and 54 weapons seized. Friendly losses have been 25 killed, 75 wounded, and two missing. Since 24 January, Operation [] has resulted in cumulative losses of 1,841 VC killed, 701 captured, over 2,000 suspects detained, and 303 individual and crew-served weapons seized. Friendly losses are 377 killed (245 US, 126 ARVN, 6 ROK), 484 wounded (86 US, 370 ARVN, 28 ROK) and six US missing.

6. In III Corps area on 5 March during Operation [] in Binh Duong Province, a battalion of the 3rd Brigade, US 1st Infantry Division contacted an estimated VC battalion. Another US infantry battalion was promptly helilifted as reinforcements. The VC battalion, trapped between the 1st Division battalions for almost six hours, was subjected to infantry and artillery fire, and 55 tactical air strikes. VC losses were 189 killed and five captured; friendly losses were five killed and 15 wounded.

7. There was no significant friendly activity in IV Corps area this week.

8. Free World Forces conducted 106 operations of battalion size or larger during the week, 59 of them achieving contact: 45 ARVN, two ROK, and 12 US. There were 21,905 small-unit operations, including 3,141 conducted by US forces. Of the 150 small-unit

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

~~SECRET~~

operations which achieved contact with the enemy, 98 were conducted by US units.

9. There were six B-52 Stratofortress missions flown over South Vietnam during the period 28 February to 6 March 1966; ground exploitation was scheduled to follow two of these missions. No bomb damage assessment has been received. During the period 25 Feb - 3 Mar 1966 a total of 3,431 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, Marine and VNAF aircraft. In addition to close air support, direct air support and interdiction missions in support of ground operations, the following damage was inflicted: 2,678 structures, 106 sampans, 44 bunkers, three bridges, three AW sites, one ammo storage area and one warehouse were destroyed; 2,051 structures, 73 sampans, 11 bunkers, five boats and one warehouse were damaged; one ford was cratered. One hundred sixty-five Viet Cong were reported as probably killed by aircraft. Four US aircraft were lost (two Marine, one Navy and one Air Force); all crew members were recovered.

Communist Activity

10. Communist activity in I Corps area declined although there was a two-battalion attack against the ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion about seven miles northwest of Quang Ngai City. Friendly losses were eight killed and 16 wounded; the enemy lost 151 killed. MACV attributes the decrease in activity to the friendly operations in this area.

11. There was no significant enemy activity in the II Corps, and the decline in incidents from that of the previous reporting period was substantial---210 to 132.

12. In III Corps area on 27 February, the SS LORINDA, a small cargo ship of Panamanian registry, was attacked by Viet Cong using small arms and 57-mm recoilless rifle fire approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Saigon on the Long Tao River. The ship was hit by ten 57-mm rounds and ran aground, but it was later refloated and proceeded to Saigon. On 3 March, on the same river, a self-propelled Vietnamese



barge received 57-mm recoilless rifle fire which injured six crew members. On 4 March, a US lighter was fired on near the same location. The 225th VC Engineer Battalion has been reported in this general area with the mission of interdicting ship and barge traffic along the Long Tao River.

13. Over-all enemy activity in III Corps declined but there were two large-scale attacks reported. On 27 February, in Binh Duong Province an estimated Viet Cong battalion supported by 60-mm mortars attacked the 7th ARVN Regiment. Two battalions of the VC 165th Regiment are reported to be in this area. The second large-scale attack was in Binh Tuy Province on 28 February when the Viet Cong attacked two ARVN positions simultaneously. An estimated reinforced battalion attacked the 1st Battalion of the 43rd Regiment (ARVN); friendly forces losses were 32 killed, 60 wounded, and 17 missing. Viet Cong losses were 48 killed and three Viet Cong captured. The captives claim to be from the 186th Main Force Battalion. This attack in normally quiet Binh Tuy Province is considered to be an effort by the Viet Cong to regain influence in areas where friendly forces have recently conducted operations.

14. There was no significant change in Viet Cong activity in IV Corps. One small-scale attack occurred in Binh Tuong Province on 28 February when two outposts were attacked. At the same time, heavy fire was placed on Tan Hiep Training Center and four adjacent villages. The attacking force was reported to have been elements of the 514th Local Force Battalion. According to one report, this battalion has received experienced cadre and has been given the mission of cutting Highway 4, west of My Tho.

15. National Route 1 is partially closed in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh provinces. Route 14 is partially closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Duc Co, Pleiku Province. Route 7 is closed in Phu Yen Province. Route 20 is closed in Lam Dong and Long Khanh Provinces. Route 21 is closed in eastern Darlac Province. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces.

16. The National Railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Song La Song, Binh Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province; and between Da Nang and Hué.

C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (Formerly Rural Construction)

1. The new training cycle for cadres for pacification work in the provinces under the Revolutionary Development program began at Vung Tau on 21 February with a class of nearly 4,800 trainees. Officials credit the excellent recruiting response to deferment from the draft, good pay, and the logical, but often abused, practice of returning cadres to their own provinces. The Vung Tau training site for the 59-man groups is the one used successfully in the past year to train the People's Action Teams (PATs).

2. The 59-man revolutionary development cadre groups are broken down into four sections. Basic security will be provided by a 33-man PAT element. Under this protection, a six-man civil affairs team, a six-man census grievance team, and a six-man new life development team will operate. The remaining eight men are either team chiefs or members of the group's small staff. All of the above elements making up the 59-man group previously existed separately. It was agreed at the recent Honolulu conference to combine the most productive aspects of previous pacification attempts to make the program more appealing to a greater cross section of the target population.

3. On 4 March, Colonel Le Tuong was replaced as Binh Dinh Province chief by Colonel Tran Dinh Vong, a protege of II Corps commander General Vinh Loc. US observers fear that the change will have a deleterious effect on the II Corps national priority area in the province. Pacification progress to date in Binh Dinh has been credited largely to Colonel Tuong and his deputy, Major Nguyen Be, who is expected to leave as well. Major Be has been most effective in utilizing cadres, especially the PATs, who are considered to be the best Vietnamese units operating in the province. The national priority area in Binh Dinh will utilize 14 revolutionary development cadre groups of 65 men each instead of the 59-man standard group. In view of the change of province chiefs, the final composition of the development program may undergo further revision.

~~SECRET~~

25X1

4. Students from the National Institute of Administration will be made available for field assignments in a few weeks, in accordance with Premier Ky's decree. The 400 trainees are at various stages in the three-year program and will be divided between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Revolutionary Development.

5. In a statement to newsmen, Lt. General Dang Van Quang, IV Corps commander, said that, as of mid-February, 58 percent of the IV Corps population is under government control. He cited the following numbers of persons and hamlets as having fulfilled the criteria of a secured area:

	<u>Population</u>	<u>Number of Hamlets</u>
1965	2,700,000	1,515
1966		
(thru mid-February) +	<u>400,000</u>	+ <u>331</u>
	3,100,000	1,846

The MACV estimate for 1965 is approximately the same.

6. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). Although final figures are still being compiled in the field, the number of returnees in February set a new high, according to the US mission.

25X1
25X1

7. Refugees. Special Commissioner for Refugees Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que, although attached to the premier's office, does not have ministerial status. He has the military rank of major, and therefore is subordinate to the corp commanders and most province chiefs. The degree of support his office receives is not yet clear,

~~SECRET~~

25X1

~~SECRET~~


Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

25X1

but from talks with Dr. Que and Chief of State Thieu US officials indicate that the attitude of the GVN has changed from its former narrow concept of refugee problems. The influx of displaced persons continues, as indicated in the following comparison of refugee figures for the last two reporting periods:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Tempo- rary Shelters</u>	<u>Resettled</u>	<u>Returned to Their Villages</u>
20 Feb	833,875	444,549	294,902	94,424
28 Feb	868,712	458,194	316,094	94,424

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

A. MILITARY SITUATION

[REDACTED] presence of four additional SAM sites in North Vietnam. These sites--numbers 93 through 96--are located at scattered points within the already established SAM envelope and give added depth to the DRV's air defense posture.

2. An increase in the number of operational MIG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft also was revealed in

[REDACTED]

the Hanoi area was continuing. Forty-nine large aircraft revetments now are completed at Phuc Yen, and 12 temporary revetments have been constructed on the parking apron along the taxiway. At Kep Airfield, 15 large revetments are complete and 12 are under construction. Four temporary revetments have been built on the parking apron. A runway extension effort is under way on one of Hanoi's Gia Lam Airfield's two runways.

B. POLITICAL SITUATION

Chinese Policy

4. The Chinese Communists appear to have sent letters last month to various neutral nations reiterating Peking's opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict except on Communist terms. Peking probably hopes that this tactic will help to generate

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

neutral-nation pressures on the US to accept a solution
along lines sought by the Communists.

5. Chinese intransigence on the Vietnam issue was also reflected in the latest "secret" letter to the Soviet Communist Party. The letter's major emphasis rested on the assertion that Peking no longer expects Moscow to honor its treaty commitment to China's defense, but the Chinese also boldly reiterated charges which have appeared more or less explicitly in Chinese propaganda. These are that Moscow has supported "American peace fables," tried to sow dissension between Hanoi and Peking, and passed on secret information to the US.

Soviet Objection to UN Consideration of Vietnam

6. On 1 March, in a pro forma statement, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Fedorenko "resolutely objected" to the attempts made by Security Council president for February--Japanese Ambassador Matsui--to sum up "the general sentiment" of the council members on Vietnam. The Soviet ambassador claimed that the Japanese delegate's actions violated the Council's rule of procedure, and labeled Matsui's recent letter to the Security Council members an "illegal and arbitrary act" designed to support US attempts to disguise its "widening aggression." This Soviet objection together with that of Mali and Bulgaria has probably quashed the Vietnam issue in the UN for the time being.

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

~~SECRET~~

25X1

C. REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1. A Korean press service reported on 8 March that Chief of State Thieu will pay a four-day visit to South Korea on 2 May. Accompanied by Deputy Premier Co, Foreign Minister Do, and economic adviser Ton, Thieu reportedly plans to discuss ROK-GVN political, economic, and military cooperation as well as the possibility of an Asian anti-Communist summit conference.

25X1

E. DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS

1. Embassy Rabat reports that there has been some annoyance within the Moroccan Government with Saigon's failure to forward letters of credence to the Vietnamese ambassador-designate even after Morocco had granted agreement and had invited him to present his credentials. Embassy Saigon urged the GVN to forward letters of credence to its ambassadors in Morocco and the Ivory Coast.

F. FREE WORLD AID

1. AUSTRALIA: Prime Minister Harold Holt announced on 8 March that the Australian military contingent in South Vietnam will be increased from 1,700 to 4,500 personnel. The battalion now in Vietnam will be replaced by a task force which will include two infantry battalions, a Special Air Service squadron, and other support elements. This new commitment is very near the limit in military manpower which Australia can contribute short of going on a wartime footing.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET

25X1

25X1

2. REPUBLIC OF KOREA: The ROK announced on 28 February that it will send a regimental combat team and a full division, plus supporting units, to augment its forces in South Vietnam. The consent bill to send these forces was submitted to the National Assembly and formally taken up on 2 March. Debate on the measure is under way, and passage by the National Assembly is expected around 19 March. There seems little doubt that the Assembly will give its consent despite objections of the opposition parties.

3. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: On 4 March, the German chargé in Saigon formally donated two mobile dental clinics worth about US \$70,000.

4. JAPAN: According to a Japanese news agency, the Japanese Government decided on 1 March to donate 72,034,000 yen (about US \$200,000) in cotton fabrics, blankets, and home medicines through the Vietnam Society, a private Japanese organization.

5. SWEDEN: On 1 March, a National Fund Collection Drive for Vietnam was announced in Sweden. The drive has the support of the Swedish prime minister, all political party leaders, and many prominent businessmen and intellectuals and is professedly "humanitarian, nonpolitical, and impartial." The funds will be distributed to Vietnam as a whole through the Swedish Red Cross which will ensure that the money is "properly spent." Embassy Stockholm presumes that this means a three-way split between South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, as was done in September 1965 with a \$60,000 donation from the Swedish Red Cross.

SECRET

25X1

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS


Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

WEEKLY REPORT 27 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH 1966

SECRET

Total Personnel Losses


(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)



US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (including North Vietnam)

	Fatalities	Non-fatal Wounds
Cumulative, 1961-1964	255	1524
Cumulative, 1965	1365	6110
Cumulative, 1966 to date	718	890
TOTAL	2338	11524

(Figures do not include missing or captured.)



Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses (US/GVN/Other Free World)

Killed in action
 Missing or Captured in action
 Wounded in action

61431


Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS


WEEKLY REPORT 27 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH 1966

SECRET


Viet Cong Incidents




Viet Cong Attacks



Weapons Losses




FEBRUARY, 1966




SECRET
61433

FEBRUARY, 1966




SECRET
61437

FEBRUARY, 1966



SECRET
61434

FEBRUARY, 1966



Annual Totals


	Military	Totals
1964	1,903	14,465
1965	9,472	42,552
1966*	1,318	4,173

*Only thru 12 Feb

— Monthly Totals
■ Military

SECRET
61436

FEBRUARY, 1966



	Regular Forces	Totals
1962	11,203	29,924
1963	9,666	36,441
1964	21,441	73,010
1965	47,297	113,168

SECRET
61438

GVN statistics do not differentiate between deserters who eventually return or enlist in other government units, remain AWOL, or defect to the Viet Cong. Statistics do show that 53% of the regular force desertions are among draftees who comprise 13% of the regular force strength.

SECRET

25X1

South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 28 February 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period	Viet Cong Inci- dents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	*1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882

-S1-

SECRET

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
**1966	7014	1762	7375	3652	-	927	1096	6341	8471	2011	2198

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

**Through 28 February 1966

-S2-

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET

25X1

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 28 February 1966

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 28 February 1966										
Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small-Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total					
Jan	1962	1825	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
	1963	927	242	8	2	252	447	49	179	-
	1964	1770	218	2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
	1965	2206	57	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
	1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
Feb	1962	1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
	1963	788	181	13	1	195	433	69	91	-
	1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	201	271	-
	1965	1982	73	6	3	82	1411	267	91	131
	*1966	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
Mar	1962	1961	561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
	1963	1282	333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
	1964	2160	198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	-
	1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
Apr	1962	1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
	1963	1331	371	9	3	383	688	105	155	-
	1964	2284	211	6	3	220	1738	169	157	-
	1965	1860	38	1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
May	1962	1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
	1963	1208	344	13	0	357	608	93	150	-
	1964	2143	170	3	2	175	1418	217	140	193
	1965	2263	40	7	11	58	1555	365	115	170
Jun	1962	1477	339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
	1963	1311	398	11	1	410	652	107	142	-
	1964	2062	128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
	1965	2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172

SECRET

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small-Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total					
Jul	1962	1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	-
	1963	1368	398	8	1	407	698	80	183	-
	1964	3045	166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
	1965	2520	42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
Aug	1962	1642	368	10	0	378	885	146	233	-
	1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	-
	1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
	1965	2498	38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
Sep	1962	1375	382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
	1963	1763	483	17	3	503	889	164	207	-
	1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
	1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
Oct	1962	1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	-
	1963	1422	359	6	0	365	802	105	150	-
	1964	2827	75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
	1965	3330	24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
Nov	1962	1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
	1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
	1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
	1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
Dec	1962	1346	375	8	1	384	670	107	185	-
	1963	1921	258	3	0	261	1298	111	251	-
	1964	2504	81	9	6	96	1719	318	128	243
	1965	4106	32	18	7	57	2572	442	317	718

Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	31529	531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
*1966	7014	92	33	14	139	4319	513	471	1572

*Through 28 February 1966

-S4-

~~SECRET~~


25X1

SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Consumer Price Index (For Working-Class Family in Saigon)


(1959=100)

January 1963 - December 1965




Money Supply (Millions of Piasters)

January 1964 - December 1965



Foreign Exchange Reserves (Millions of US Dollars)

January 1964 - December 1965



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9

Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010039-9